LEIBKIZ'S INTERPRETATION OF HIS LOGICAL CALCULI NICHOLAS RESCHER
The historical researches of Louis Couturat saved the logical work of Leibniz from the oblivion of neglect and forgetfu1ness.l They revealed that Leibniz developed in succession several versions of a "logical calculus" (calculus ratiocinator or calculus universalis). In consequence of Couturat's investigations it has become well known that Leibniz's development of these logical calculi adumbrated the notion of a logistic system2; and for these foreshadowings of the logistic treatment of formal logic Leibniz is rightly regarded as the father of symbolic logic.
I t is clear from what has been said that it is scarcely possible to overestimate the debt which the contemporary student of Leibniz's logic owes to Couturat. This gratitude must, however, be accompanied by the realization that Couturat's own theory of logic is gravely defective. Couturat was persuaded that the extensional point of view in logic is the only one which is correct, an opinion now quite antiquated, and shared by no This prejudice of Couturat's marred his exposition of Leibniz's logic. It led him to battle with windmills: he viewed the logic of Leibniz as rife with shortcomings stemming from an intensional approach.
The task of this paper is a re-examination of Leibniz's logic.4 It will consider without prejudgment how Leibniz conceived of the major formal systems he developed as logical calculi -that is, these systems will be studied with a view to the interpretation or interpretations which Leibniz himself intends for them. The aim is to undo some of the damage which Couturat's preconception has done to the just understanding of Leibniz's logic and to the proper evaluation of his contribution.
A remark concerning the mode of presentation adopted in this paper is in order. In describing the logical calculi devised by Leibniz we employ the schematism provided by the concept of a logistic system. Admittedly Leibniz did not possess a full and complete grasp of the logistic method, a fact evidenced by several misgivings which we shall have to express in the course of our exposition. However, even a cursory perusal of the writings we shall have occasion to cite suffices to justify our course. Leibniz is sufficiently close to a logistic treatment of logic to make a cautious and ,careful extrapolation to explicitly logistic formulation historically legitimate, as well as highly helpful towards securing understanding of what he has in mind.
From this standpoint, then, Leibniz's most fully developed efforts at a symbolic treatment of logic have a common basis comprising the following five features :
1. Variables whose range is a set of otherwise unspecified objects called "terms" (termini). 2. Singulary and binary operators on "terms" yielding "terms". 3. Binary relations between "terms", including equality. 4. The rules of inference5:
i. Equality obtains between "termH-denoting complexes iff (if and only if) they are inter-substitutable in asserted statements.6
ii. In any asserted statement involving some "termH-variable this may be replaced throughout by another "termw-variable, or by some other "termw-denoting complex, and the result will again be an asserted statement.'
"eibniz possessed to an insufficient extent the disti~lction -basic to the concept of a rule of inference -between a statement of the system and a statement about the system in a meta-language. However, he is often sufficiently close to an appreciation of the distinction in question to justify the explicit formulation of rules of inference. Thus, for example, in the marginalia given on pages 223-227 of vol. 7 of Phil. Schr. (Gerhardt) , Leibniz distinguishes between verae propositiones, i.e., assertions of the system, and principiae calcztli, i.e., rules for obtaining further assertions from given ones.
Leibniz's classic definition of equality, "Eadem sunt quorum unum in alterius locum substitui potest, salva veritate" (Phil. Schr. (Gerhardt) , vol. 7 , p. 219), is defective both as regards the distinction of use and mention, and that between object and meta-language. Our statement has repaired these defects.
7 Quicquid conclusum est in literis quibusquam indefinitis, idem intelligi debit conclusum in aliis quibuscunque easdem conditionibus habentibus, ut quia verum est ab est a , etiam verunl erit bc est b, imo et bcd est bc (Phil. Schr. (Gerhardt), vol. 7, p. 224). . . .
111.
The modus ponens rule.8 5. A group of asserted statements which provides the axiomatic basis for the system. Leibniz's efforts at a symbolic treatment of formal logic led him to construct three main versions of a logical c a l c~l u s .~ We will study these systems, proceeding chronologically.
The first of these systems, dating from around 1679, grew out of Leibniz's attempt to devise an arithmetic treatment of logic.10 An exposition is given in the essays Specimen calculi universalisl~ and Ad specimen calculi universalis addenda12. Leibniz employs lower-case Roman letters for "term"-variables. Operators on "terms" are 'non' (singulary), and juxtaposition (binary). Relations between "terms" are 'est,' its negation 'non est,' equality (for which Leibniz used "eadem sunt" or other forms, such as "sunt idem," but which we represent by the conventional =), and inequality ("diversa sunt"). The following are asserted statements of this system :
1. a est a In Iisting the assertions of this system no effort has been made to distinguish between axiomatic and derived assertions, though Leibniz's own expositions do distinguish between axioms (propositiones per se verae) and propositions established from them (verae propositiones).ls The principal reason for abandoning this distinction here is that several brief sketches were drawn up by Leibniz for the system we are considering (as well as for those we have yet to consider), and the set of assertions used as axioms varies from one expository sketch to another. The magnitude of the logical part of the Leibnizian corpus also makes impractical a complete he consistency of this system is immediately apparent from the existence of the following interpretation: let the "terms" be sets, 'non' complementation, let juxtaposition represent intersection, lest' inclusion, and let propriety be non-nullity. This interpretation also serves the purpose of exhibiting the relation of Leibniz's first logical calculus to our modern classlogic, which will become plainer yet in the later discussion of Leibniz's own interpretations of this system. Our presentation of Leibniz's interpretations of his systems of logical calculus involves a departure from Leibniz's own mode of presentation. Although he was clearly aware of the distinction between an abstract axiomatic system and the interpreted system obtained from it by specifying meanings for the symbolism, Leibniz's own expositions commonly develop a system and one-or-more of its intended interpretations side by side. As an expository asset, and particularly to gain added clarity, this paper draws the line sharply, and lays down each interpretation in a separate, explicit fashion. Leibniz's relevant writings show this to be well warranted by his own treatment.20
To lay down an interpretation for Leibniz's first logical calculus it suffices to specify (1) the set of "terms," (2) the effects of the n o n operator, and of the operation of juxtaposition, (3) the meaning of the relation est, and (4) the meaning of propriety; provided that this is done so as to satisfy the assertions. This is so because the meanings of "non est," "=", and ' I + " will then be determined by 7, 5, and 6, respectively.
One interpretation given by Leibniz for this system is obtained by letting "terms" be predicates taken in intension, i.e., properties. The result of operating on a "term" (property) by n o n is the property of not having the property in question -n o n represents the negatio or negation of properties. The result of juxtaposing two "terms" is the property of possessing both of the properties in question -juxtaposition represents the additio or conjunctio, the joining of properties. A "term" (property) is proper if it l9 I will therefore confine myself here to referring each of the forty assertions we shall encounter to one occurrence in Leibniz's writings. I have selected in each case the occurrence which, to my knowledge, may be presumed to be the earliest chronologi- is not of universal comprehension (i.e., null extension). Finally, the result of linking two "term" names by 'est' is the statement that the former property contains the latter in its intension or comprehension. Thus 'a est b' symbolizes the universal affirmative proposition that whatever is characterized by the property a is also characterized by the property b, i.e., that all a's are b's.
A second interpretation is given by Leibniz for this system. This is obtained by letting "terms" be predicates taken in extension, i.e., classes. The result of operating on a "term" (class) by non is the class of all objectsz1 not belonging to the class in question. The result of juxtaposing "terms" is the class of all objects belonging to both of the classes in question. A "term" (property) is proper if it is not of null extension (universal comprehension). Finally, the result of linking two "term" names by 'est' is the statement that the former class is contained in the latter in extension, i.e., ' a est b' symbolizes the universal affirmative proposition that all a's are b's.
I t is plain that in these two interpretations of his first system Leibniz treats adjectives (property-names) and substantives (class-names) in an entirely parallel fashion. He justifies this by remarking that to any adjectival property, such as (is an) animal, there is a corresponding substantival class, in this case the animals. And he asserts that as regards symbolic treatment the distinction between these is i r r e l e~a n t .~~ By exploiting this duality of property intension and class extension Leibniz is able to provide a twin-interpretation for his first system of logical calculus, and so to develop its possibilities of interpretation. This important point is entirely missed by Couturat, who views Leibniz's discussion of this matter as needless verbiage, calculated to accommodate the scholastic^.^^ Indeed, Couturat is kept from a proper understanding of the first of Leibniz's interpretations 21 AS objects (entia), Leibniz holds, one can take either all actually~existing things, or else all which are (logically) possible. The dictum de omni et nullo must then be taken in the appropriate sense (Phil. S c h r . (Gerhardt), vol. 7, p. 214).
22 Substantizlum [n.b.] est quod includit nomen Ens vel res; Adjectivum quod non includit. I t a animal est substantivum, seu idem quod ens animale. Rationale est adjectivum, fit enim demum substantivum, si adjicias Ens, dicendo Ens rationale, vel per compendium una voce (si jocari licet) Rational. U t ex termino Ens animale: animal. (n.b. Hae definitiones usui scholae sunt accommodatae, sed in characteristibus [i.e., in the symbolism] necesse non est differentiam nominis substantivi atque adjectivi apparare, neque illa vero usum habet ullum (Phil. S c h r . (Gerhardt), vol. 7, p. 227).
23 Witness Couturat's comment on the passage cited in the previous footnote: "Cette influence scolastique se rCv&le par les dkfinitions des termes de la logiqile traditionelle (grammaticale) dont Leibniz reconnait lui-meme I'inutilitk" (Logique, p. 337, notes). of this system by his conviction that any but the extensional point of view is inadequate for I n this first system Leibniz is able to treat the entire classical doctrine of categorical propositions. Thus, S a P , S e P, S i P , and S o P are rendered (in either interpretation) as S est P, S est non-P, S non est non-P, and S non est P , respectively. The symbolic version of the entire classical theory of immediate inference and the syllogism is available in the assertions of the system. I t is a t this point that the propriety condition acquires significance. The assertions (particularly 19") which guarantee the validity of two of the classical modes of inference, subalternation and partial conversion, are dependent on the propriety of the terms involved. And Leibniz is, throughout all of his logical work concerned to preserve the validity of the entire classical theory of immediate inference and of the syllogism.25 With him symbolic logic was the symbolic treatment of the classical, traditional logic. Leibniz's second system was developed in the 1685-6 period during which his metaphysical system assumed its final and completed form in virtually every detail. This is no mere coincidence. This system played a central role in Leibniz's solution of a logical problem on which he felt the progress of his metaphysics to depend: the problem of reconciling his belief that there are true, contingent propositions with his conviction that all true propositions are analytic.26 This accounts for Leibniz's subsequent marginal comment, "Hic egregie progressus sum", on the manuscript Generales inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatumZ7, which is the main vehicle for the presentation of this system. The essays Principia calculi rationalis2s and Difficultates 1 0 g i c a e~~ also throw light on this system, as do the later sketches (1690) Primaria calculi Logici fundamenta30 and
Fundamenta calculi l~g i c i .~~
This second of Leibniz's systems of logical calculus is an extension of '2%outurat holds that the extensional view of logic is "la seule qui permette de soumettre la Logique au traitement mathkmatique" (Logique, p. 32). This prejudice on his part leads Couturat to hold Leibniz's intensional point of view responsible for the shortcomings -generally rather imagined than actual -of his logical work (Logique, and elsewhere) . 25 One of the clearest expressions of this concern is the essay Difficultates logicae (Phil. Schr. (Gerhardt), vol. 7, pp. 21 1-21 7).
28 Regarding Leibniz's solution see the writer's article, Contingence in the philosophy of Leibnii, Philosophical review, vol. 61 (1952), pp. 26-39. 27 Opuscules e t f r a g m e n t s (Couturat), pp. 356-399, and cf. also ibid., pp. 26 1-264.
28 Opuscules e t f r a g m e n t s (Couturat), pp. 229-23 1. 29 Phil. Schr. (Gerhardt), vol. 7, pp. 21 1-217. Opuscules e t f r a g m e n t s (Couturat), pp. 232-237. 31 Opuscules e t f r a g m e n t s (Couturat), pp. 421-423. Couturat's discussion of this system is given on pages 344-362 of Logique. the first. I t includes as assertions all those of the first system, though there are some changes in the notation. Upper case Roman letters are used for variables. "Continet" occasionally replaces "est," and the equality of A and B is rendered: "A w B" or " A x, B" or "coincidunt A et B" or sometimes "aequivalent A et B." Also, there is one fundamentally new element, the "term"-constant Ens or Res. This is introduced in connection with the propriety condition; propriety is given by the definition: A is proper iff A non est n o n -E n~.~~ As assertions this system adds the following five to the nineteen we have listed for the first system: 20. The nature of this augmented system is perhaps best apprehended by considering an interpretation in terms of modern class-logic, which also shows the consistency of the system. Let the "terms" be sets, 'non' complementation, let juxtaposition represent intersection, Ens the universal class, and propriety non-nullity. Finally, let 'est' represent inclusion among nonnull sets, in accord with the rule: "A est B" is "A=A" or "A C B & AB+An according as B is empty (null) or not. All assertions of the second system are readily verified for this i n t e r p r e t a t i~n .~~ Let us now turn to Leibniz's own interpretations for this system. Since it is an extension of the first system, the only additional step in laying down an interpretation for this second system is specification of the meaning of the "term" Ens.
One interpretation given by Leibniz for this system is virtually the same as the intensional interpretation of his first system. The "terms" are I.eibniz gives this also: "Esto N non est A , AT non est B, item N non e.jt C, c t ~t a porro, tunc dici potest N est Nihil [i.e., non-Ens]. Huc pertinet quod \ulgo dicunt,> non Entis nulla esse Attributa" (Couturat, Logique, p. 349, notes).
Couturat is patently misguided xvhen he remarks in discussing this lait passage (Ibid.,and cf. p. 353, ilotes) that, "cette dkfinition, inspirke, comme on \ , o~t , de la tradition scholastique, n ' a aucune valeur. Tout au contraire, on dkfinit a prksent le zCro logique conlnle le terme qui est contenu dans tous les autres (en extension), comme le sujet tle tous les prkdicats possibles." " The method of proof b y cases facilitates the check.
predicates in intension (i.e., properties), and the non-operator and juxtaposition are defined as in the analogous case of the previous system. The result of linking "term" names by 'est' is again the statement that the former property contains -"continet" is occasionally used in place of "est" -the latter in intension: if A est B, all A's are B's. The "term" (property) Ens is of null comprehension (universal extension) ; it represents the property containing no (proper) property in its intension or compre11ension.~5
Leibniz also provides an extensional interpretation for this system which is, essentially, the same as that of the first system. The "terms" are predicates in extension (classes), and the non-operator and juxtaposition are respectively complementation and intersection, as with the first system. The "term" Ens is the class of universal extension,36 and propriety is, therefore, non-nullity. Finally, "est" represents the containment of (proper) classes: " A est B" signifies that the class A is contained in the class B, i.e., that all A's are B's.
In both of these interpretations the classical theory of immediate inference and of the syllogism can be accommodated. Leibniz offers several sets of renditions of the categorical propositions. Among these are the three following :3'
(1) (2) (3) a : Snon-P est non-Ens S est P S P -S e: SP est non-Ens S est non-P S P =+ SPEns i: SP est Ens S non est non-P S P -SPEns o : Snon-P est Ens S non est P SP $: S.
One point regarding this system has led to some misunderstanding. This is Leibniz's occasional use of "continet" for "est." He employs this usage only when dealing with the intensional interpretation, which is quite proper, since the fact that A contains B in its intension or comprehension -i.e., that all A's are B's -is represented by " A est B." On the other hand, if "est" is to be interpreted in terms of containment in the extensional interpretation, then "A est B" must be read "A is contained in B," or else, if "est" is still to be read as "contains," then A and B must be interchanged. This is explicitly stated by Leibniz in several places.3* It has been mi.;-35 If non-A is proper, non-A est Ens, whence non-Ens est A . Thus lion-Ens is of (virtually) universal intension, and so the intension of E n s is null. 36 E n s is the class of all things (entia).See footnote 2 1. 37 Such sets of symbolic versions of categorical propositions are given in man!, places, including pp. 21 1-217 of vol. 7 of P h i l . S c h r . (Gerhardt), and pp. 232-33 of O p u s c u l e s e t f r a g m e n t s (Couturat). Couturat's apparent denial (Logique, p. 30) notwithstanding, the intensional interpretation of this second system is adequate to classical syllogistic logic.
construed as being a statement on Leibniz's part to the effect that " A est B" may be taken as symbolizing "A contains B (in extension)", and thus as stating in an extensional interpretation of the system that all A's are B's. This does not yield a valid interpretation of the system, or rather more accurately, it could be correct only if juxtaposition were to represent alternation (i.e., set union or addition),39 whereas it is uniformly and consistently used by Leibniz to represent conjunction (i.e., set intersection or multiplication). Couturat is guilty of this m i s c o n s t r u~t i o n ,~~ and on this basis he accuses Leibniz of falling into error by misguided adherence to an intensional point of view. (The purported error in question is that 1,eibniz fails, because of intensional prejudice, to take juxtaposition as extensional -rather than intensional -union or a d d i t i~n .~~) Leibniz offers still another interpretation of this second system, one which makes it the forerunner of C.I. Lewis's systems of strict implication. In this interpretation "terms" are propositions, non represents negation, juxtaposition represents conjunction, and est stands for the relation of entailment.4Vns represents logical necessity or logical truth, and so propriety is logical con~istency.~3 Leibniz rightly views this system, thus interpreted, as a modal l o g i~4~, and thus merits Lewis's estimation of him as a precursor.
In this interpretation, and in it alone, the result of linking "terms" (propositions) by 'lest" is again a "term." Thus formulas such as " ( A est B ) est (C est D)" are meaningful in this i n t e r p r e t a t i~n .~~ I t is also of interest to observe that Leibniz exploited the opportunity, afforded by assertion 23, of defining entailment in terms of negation, conjunction, and the notion of p0ssibility.~6
We now turn to Leibniz's third and final system of logical calculus. This system was developed in 1690. The writer conjectures that the motivating force underlying its development was Leibniz's growing conviction that the notions of part, whole, and containment are the fundamental concepts of " A is necessary iff A --Ens. A is impossible if non-'4 is necessary, and it readily follows t h a t , "(Juod continet Bnon-B, idem est quod irnpossibile" (Opuscules et fragments (Couturat), p. 368). The concept of containment provided the central idea underlying Leibniz's interpretations of his first two systems. Already in the second system the notation "continet" was occasionally used in place of "est."
48 Opuscules e t f r a g m e n t s (Couturat), pp. The consistency of this system follows from the existence of the following interpretation :Let "terms" be classes, N the null class, non complementation, + class union, inest class inclusion, and let x,A, and -be defined by 35, 32, and 36, respectively. This interpretation is also of interest in connection with the following, more general considerations.
Leibniz explicitly intends this system to provide an abstract theory of containment. Given a sound application of the concepts of whole and of part, an interpretation of this third system is, Leibniz claims, available.51 For if such a notion of containing is given, then "A inest B" can be taken to represent " B contains A (in the sense in question)," "non-A" represents that containing everything not contained in A, N is that which contains nothing, A +-B contains everything contained in A or in B or both, and all else may be interpreted correspondingly.
I n the light of our discussion of the previous systems, it is clear how Leibniz constructs interpretations of this system as a logic of predicates in intension and also as a logic of predicates in extension. Thus the four categorical propositions, a, e, i, and o, are rendered S inest P , S A P , S h P , and S non inest P extensionally, and in intension as P inest S , P A S , P /\ S , and P non inest S . Again, the classical theory of immediate inference and the syllogism is available in the assertions of the system. However, assertion 35 is required both for subalternation and partial conversion, and so both of these inferences must be conjoined with an explicit statement of the non-nullity of the terms involved. I n this feature of explicitness, together with its more abstract and general nature, resides the superiority of Leibniz's third system over the first two.
Here our survey of Leibniz's interpretations of his three principal logical calculi reaches its end. We have seen that these interpretations are of three types: a logic of predicates in intension, a logic of predicates in extension, and a modal logic of propositions. I n each case our investigation has revealed? the soundness of the interpretation. We have found nothing to support
